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Abstract. In this paper, we carefully study both distinguishing and key-
recovery attacks against Bluetooth two-level E0 given many short frames.
Based on a aw in the resynchronization of Bluetooth E0, we are able to fully
exploit the largest bias of the nite state machine inside E0 for our attacks.
Our key-recovery attack works with 2
40 simple operations given the rst 24
bits of 2
35 frames. Compared with all existing attacks against two-level E0,
this is the best one so far.
1 Background
The short-range wireless technology Bluetooth uses the keystream generator E0 to
produce the keystream for encryption. After the earlier results [10,9,6] of correlation
(also called bias) properties inside the Finite State Machine (FSM) towards the
one-level E0, most recently, [12] systematically studied the biases and proved two
previously known large biases to be the only largest up to 26 consecutive bits of
the FSM output sequences. Attacks against E0 mostly focus on one-level E0 only
and the best attacks [12,1,5] work on one impractically long frame of keystream
without exception. Nevertheless, a few attacks [15,11,7{9] apply to two-level E0;
compared with feasible attack complexities on one-level E0, attack complexities on
two-level E0 are extremely high and make the practical Bluetooth E0 unbroken.
The main contribution of this paper is that rst based on one of the two largest
biases inside the FSM within one-level E0, we identify the bias at two-level E0 due
to a resynchronization aw in Bluetooth E0. Unlike the traditional approach to nd
the bias, the characterized bias does not involve the precomputation of the multiple
polynomial with low weight. Second, to utilize the identied bias, we develop a
novel attack to directly recover the original encryption key for two-level E0 without
reconstructing the initial state of E0 at the second level. Our key-recovery attack
works with 240 simple operations given the rst 24 bits of 235 frames. Compared
with all existing attacks [15,11,7{9] against two-level E0, this is the best so far.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review description
of two-level E0. In Section 3 we study the attack against one-level E0. Then, we
investigate the E0 resynchronization aw, which allows to develop the basic attack
of previous section into the distinguishing and key-recoveryattacks against two-level
E0 in Section 4; we further extend our key-recovery attack in Section 5. Finally, we
conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Core of Bluetooth E0
To briey outline, the core of E0 (both dashed boxes in Fig. 1) can be viewed
as a nonlinear ltering generator. The ltering generator consists of four LFSRs
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Fig.1. Diagram of two-level E0 keystream generation
(R1;:::;R4) which are equivalent to a single L-bit LFSR with connection polyno-
mial1 p(x) and a 4-bit FSM, where L = 128. The keystream bit of the generator
is obtained by xoring the output bit of the regularly-clocked LFSR with that of
the FSM, which takes the current state of the LFSR as input and emits one bit
(denoted by c0
t in Bluetooth specication) out of its 4-bit memory.
2.2 Review on Two-level Bluetooth E0
Let Kc be the L-bit secret key computed by the key generation algorithm E3 [3,
p783]. According to [3], the eective key K of length 8` (1  `  16) is computed
by
K(x) = Kc(x) mod g
(`)
1 (x);
where the polynomial g
(`)
1 (x) is specied in [3, p770] and has degree 8`. Bluetooth
two-level E0 (depicted in Fig. 1) uses two L-bit inputs: one is the known nonce2 P i,
the other is the linearly expanded L-bit key K0
c from K by K0
c(x) = g
(`)
2 (x)  K(x),
where the polynomial g
(`)
2 (x) is also specied in [3, p770] and has degree no larger
than L   8`; or equivalently, we can rewrite it as
K0
c = E(K); (1)
where E is a linear mapping. After initialization of the equivalent LFSR for the rst
level E0, we can express its initial state3 Ri
[ 199;:::;L 200] = (Ri
 199;:::;Ri
L 200) as
Ri
[ 199;:::;L 200] = G1(K0
c)  G2(P i); (2)
for i = 1;:::;m, where G1 and G2 are ane transformations over GF(2)L. Next
comes the so-called two-level E0:
1 Note that the connection polynomial of the equivalent single LFSR equals the product
of those of the four LFSRs.
2 By convention, hereafter we always use the superscript i to indicate the context of the
i-th frame.
3 Throughout the rest of the paper, we use the unied notation 

i
[a;:::;b] with the formatted
subscript to denote the vector (

i
a;:::;

i
b).{ During the rst level, with the FSM initial state preset to zero, E0 runs L
clocks producing 200-bit output Si
t = Ri
t  i
t and updating Ri
[t;:::;t+L 1] by
Ri
[t+1;:::;t+L] = M(Ri
[t;:::;t+L 1]) for t =  199;:::;0, where M is the linear
mapping over GF(2)L that corresponds to the companion matrix associated
with p(x). Note that rst, i
t is the output bit of the FSM fed with Ri
[t;:::;t+L 1];
second, the last L-bit output at the rst level E0 is Si
[1 L;:::;0]; last, Ri
[1 L;:::;0] =
(M72  G1)(K0
c)  (M72  G2)(P i).
{ At the beginning of the second level, the equivalent single LFSR is initialized by
V i
[1;:::;L] = G3(Si
[1 L;:::;0]), where G3 : GF(2)128 ! GF(2)128 is another ane
transformation (see [3, p772]); the FSM initial state at the second level remains
the same as the one in the end of the rst level. Note that the present time is
t = 1.
{ During the second level, for t = 1;:::;2745, E0 produces the keystream zi
t =
V i
t i
t for encryption of the i-th frame and updates V i
[t;:::;t+L 1] by V i
[t+1;:::;t+L].
2.3 An Important Note on G3
We observe that G3 is implemented in such a simple way4 that the last L-bit output
sequence of the rst level E0 is byte-wise reloaded into the four component LFSRs
in parallel at the second level E0 with only a few exceptions, which turns out to be
a aw as introduced later in Section 4. For completeness, Table 1 lists in time order
the rst 24 output bits of R1;:::;R4 individually at the beginning of E0 level two,
in terms of the L-bit input v0;:::;vL 1.
Table 1. The rst 24 output bits of LFSRs at E0 level two
LFSR output bits
R1 v71  v64; v39  v32; v7  v0
R2 v79  v72; v47  v40; v15  v8
R3 v111  v104; v87  v80; v55  v48
R4 v119  v112; v95  v88; v63  v56
2.4 The Bias inside the FSM
Our starting point would be the bias inside the FSM, which was discovered by [9,
6] and further proved in [12] to be the the largest bias up to 26-bit output sequence
of the FSM involving the smallest number of consecutive bits. Let  = 25
256, we have
Pr(c0
t  c0
t+1  c0
t+2  c0
t+3  c0
t+4 = 1) =
1
2
+

2
;
for any integer t, assuming that the L + 4 = 132-bit initial state of E0 is random
and uniformly distributed. Hereafter, we analyze as exactly described in Bluetooth
specication [3]. For convenience, we denote c0
t used for the rst and second level
keystream generation by i
t;i
t respectively. Therefore fi
tg;fi
tg being separated
sequences of fc0
tg both satisfy the same statistical property:
Pr(
i
t  
i
t+1  
i
t+2  
i
t+3  
i
t+4 = 1) =
1
2
+

2
; (3)
Pr(
i
t  
i
t+1  
i
t+2  
i
t+3  
i
t+4 = 1) =
1
2
+

2
; (4)
4 It is believed to help increase the rate of keystream generation.for any t and any i.
3 Security Analysis on E0 Level One
The goal of the attacker in this section is to recover the eective 8`-bit encryption
key K with knowledge of m L-bit output sequences Si
[1 L;:::;0] of the rst level E0
for i = 1;:::;m and the corresponding m nonces P 1;:::;P m.
3.1 Finding the Closest Sequences with Fixed Dierences
We begin with a very simple problem: given 2m L-bit sequences s1;:::;sm and
1;:::;m, where 1 = 0 and i 6= j for all i 6= j, nd the L-bit sequence r1 that
maximizes N(r1) =
Pm
i=1
PL
t=1(si
t  ri
t) where ri
t = r1
t  i
t for i = 1;:::;m and
t = 1;:::;L.
Similar to the well-known approach (see [9, p251]), the solution based on the
idea of minority vote goes fairly easy. We have
N(r1) =
L X
t=1
m X
i=1
(si
t  r1
t  i
t):
Thus, in order to maximize N(r1), we must have
r1
t = minorityfsi
t  i
t : i = 1;:::;mg
for all t = 1;:::;L. Note that in case of a tie for r1
t, we have two answers for this t-th
bit regardless of all the other bits. We nally obtain all the answers that achieve the
same maximal N(r1). The time and memory complexities of the above algorithm
both equal the data complexity O(mL).
3.2 Attack against E0 Level One
Let i
[1 L;:::;0] = R1
[1 L;:::;0]  Ri
[1 L;:::;0] for i = 1;:::;m. By Eq.(2) we have
i
[1 L;:::;0] = (M72  G2)(P 1  P i). We further set
ri
t =
4 M
j=0
Ri
t+j;

i
t =
4 M
j=0

i
t+j;
si
t =
4 M
j=0
Si
t+j;
for i = 1;:::;m and t = 1   L;:::; 4. Note that si
t  ri
t =
L4
j=0 i
t+j follows the
biased distribution by Eq.(3). As long as
Pm
i=1
P 4
t=1 L(si
tri
t) is the maximal and
i
t;Si
t are known, we can apply the preceding algorithm to recover (L   4) bits of
r1 followed by an exhaustive search on the remaining 4 bits, next solve R1, then
K0
c by Eq.(2), and nally deduce K from K0
c by Eq.(1). The time/memory/data
complexities all equal O(mL+24L), i.e. O((m+16)L). No precomputation is needed.
About the minimal m to guarantee the valid precondition
Pm
i=1
P 4
t=1 L(si
tri
t)
is the maximal, we use the result in [12, Eq.(10)] based on [2] that says regardless
of the value of L and `, we need the minimum
m 
4log2
2 (frames): (5)Consequently, we require m = 512 to recover K from Si and P i for i = 1;:::;m.
This results in the time/data/memory complexities all the same as O(216). To
verify this, we ran experiments on 512 frames of the randomly-chosen 132-bit E0
initial state 225 times. It turned out that we had 1:5 errors and 0:4 tie in average,
which means we can easily correct all errors by an extra checking step in the end
in negligible time. Finally, Table 2 compares our result with the only known5 four
attacks [7,8,11,15] working on frames of L-bit consecutive keystreams. Note that
existing attacks [7,8,11,15] directly apply to two-level E0 as well with the level-by-
level key-recovery scheme6; in contrast, our attack is completely disabled against
two-level E0 with this scheme as the attack is based on a naive assumption that
we directly observe the output of E0 level one7. In the next section, we introduce
a resynchronization aw in Bluetooth E0 that leads to a shortcut extended attack
against the two-level E0.
Table 2. Comparison of our attack with existing attacks against E0 level one given frames
of L bits
Attack Type Precomputation Time Frames Data Memory
Divide & Conquer [15] - 2
93 1 2
7 -
BDD [11] - 2
77 1 2
7 -
Algebraic Attack [7] - 2
51 2 2
8 2
51
Algebraic Attack [8] - 2
23:4 3 2
8:6 2
23:4
Our Correlation Attack - 2
16 2
9 2
16 2
16
4 Security Analysis on Two-level E0
4.1 The resynchronization Flaw in Bluetooth Two-level E0
Dene
Ui = (Ui
1;:::;Ui
L) = G3(Ri
[1 L;:::;0]): (6)
Following the description of G3 in Subsection 2.3, we can easily verify that
V i
t = Ui
t  i
 56 t  i
 48 t  i
 16 t  i
 8 t; for t = 1; :::; 8;
V i
t = Ui
t  i
 80 t  i
 72 t  i
 32 t  i
 24 t; for t = 9; :::; 16;
V i
t = Ui
t  i
 104 t  i
 96 t  i
 56 t  i
 48 t; for t = 17; :::; 24:
From the above equations, we summarize the characteristics of V i
t by
V i
t = Ui
t  i
at  i
at+8  i
bt  i
bt+8; (7)
for t = 1;:::;24, where at =  t + constb
t 1
8 c and bt =  t + const0
b
t 1
8 c. Note that
Eq.(7) is our crucial observation about Bluetooth E0 resynchronization aw which
5 In the similar approached paper [9], m is chosen as 45 for E0 level one without the
complexity estimate, because the authors focused on the two-level E0 and traded m
with the time complexity of E0 level one, whose time complexity is negligible with that
of the E0 level two.
6 namely, the initial state at the rst level is reconstructed after the initial state at the
second level is recovered
7 As a matter of fact, according to [3, p763], Bluetooth takes the correlation properties
into account and adopts the two-level scheme of keystream generation in practice on
purpose.enables a shortcut attack throughout the two levels of E0. Now, we express the
output bit zi
t of the second level E0 keystream by
z
i
t = U
i
t  
i
at  
i
at+8  
i
bt  
i
bt+8  
i
t; (8)
for t = 1;:::;24. Let ui
t =
L4
j=0 Ui
t+j and si
t =
L4
j=0 zi
t+j. From Eq.(8), we have
that
si
t  ui
t =
4 M
j=0
i
at j 
4 M
j=0
i
at j+8 
4 M
j=0
i
bt j 
4 M
j=0
i
bt j+8 
4 M
j=0
i
t+j (9)
for t = 8k+1;:::;8k+4, k = 0;1;2. Therefore, we deduce an important correlation
concerning the practical implementation of E0 from Eq.(3,4,9):
Theorem 1. Assuming independence of i
t's and i
t's, we have
Pr(si
t  ui
t = 1) =
1
2
+
5
2
for t = 8k + 1;:::;8k + 4, k = 0;1;2.
4.2 A Near-practical Distinguishing Attack against Two-level E0
Using the standard technique of linear cryptanalysis, we expect that si
t ui
t equals
one most of the time for t = 8k+1;:::;8k+4, k = 0;1;2 with a total of  10  234
samples. Since the dierence
U
i  U
j = G3(R
i
[1 L;:::;0])  G3(R
j
[1 L;:::;0]) = (G3  M
72  G2)(P
i  P
j);
is known for all i and j by Eq.(2,6), we apply the algorithm in Subsection 3.2 to
recover the bit u1
1 separately with two sets of 234 frames sharing only one common
frame denoted as the rst frame for both sets. If we get a unique solution, we
conclude the keystreams are generated by E0; otherwise, we accept them as truly
random sources. The time/data complexities are O(2  234  5), i.e. O(237). In
contrast to the conventional treatment based on nding a multiple polynomial with
low weight, no precomputation is needed in our scenario. So far, this is the only
known near-practical attack against the full two-level E0. We can further improve
the distinguisher by recovering u1
t for t = 1;:::;4 with two dierent sets of frames
of the rst 8 bits. Comparing two sets of solutions for the four bits, if we get a
majority of identical bits, then we conclude the keystreams are generated by E0,
otherwise we accept them as truly random sources. The number of frames we need
is 2  234=4 = 233. This results in time/data complexities O(233  8), i.e. O(236).
4.3 The Key-recovery Attack against Two-level E0
From last subsection and Theorem 1, we know that with 234 frames of keystreams,
we can recover twelve bits, i.e. u1
t for t = 8k + 1;:::;8k + 4, k = 0;1;2. After that,
we try exhaustively for the remaining jKj   12 bits assuming linear independency
of the twelve bits8. Note that we have
Ui = (G3  M72  G1)(K0
c)  (G3  M72  G2)(P i); (10)
8 We tested and found that the twelve bits are linearly independent for all choices of
eective keylength jKj = 8` except for jKj = 8 in which case our attack is worse than
the brute force attack and becomes meaningless anyway.by Eq.(6,2). So, we deduce from Eq.(10,1) that
Ui = (G3  M72  G1  E)(K)  (G3  M72  G2)(P i);
which means Ui is an ane transformation of K given P i and so is ui. Thus, we
can ultimately solve the eective key K from ui. The total time complexity of our
attack is computed as
234 + 2jKj 13 =

234; jKj < 48
2jKj 13; jKj  48
The data complexity of our attack is (234   1)  24 + 128, i.e. O(238:6), as we need
234   1 frames of the rst 24 bits plus one frame of 128 bits. Table 3 compares our
attack with existing attacks [15,11,7{9] against the two-level Bluetooth E0. Note
that the number of required frames completely depends on the frame size in [7]
to meet the requirement of data amount. This is, to our best knowledge, the rst
non-trivial9 attack against practical E0 with various key length. Notice that when
40  jKj  80, our attack oers the best performance over the others.
Table 3. Comparison of our attack with existing attacks against two-level Bluetooth E0
Attack Precomputation Time Frames Data Memory
exhaustive search - 2
jKj 1 1 jKj -
[15] - 2
93 1 2
7 -
[11] - 2
113 1 2
7 -
[7] - 2
73 - 2
43 2
51
[8] 2
80 2
65 2 2
12:4 2
80
[9] 2
80 2
70 45 2
17 2
80
Our Attack - 2
jKj 13 + 2
34 2
34 2
38:6 2
34
Remark 2. Note that our attack is based on one of the largest two (linearly depen-
dent) biases which is introduced in Eq.(3). As time/data tradeo, we might also
expect to have some other linearly independent biases to be large enough so that
the time is decreased at somewhat reasonably increasing cost of data/memory com-
plexities. Nonetheless, using the computation formula of [12], we nd none such bias
that leads to the data complexity of less than 250.
Remark 3. As the nonces P i's are ane transformation of a 26-bit clock and a mas-
ter device address, our attack requiring much more than 226 frames of keystreams
still remains impractical unfortunately.
5 Extended Key-recovery Attack against Two-level E0
5.1 A Partial Key-recovery Attack
Notice that on one hand, each of the four leftmost biased bits on the right-hand
side of Eq.(9) is computed only with a certain subset of xed key bits, the known
nonce and the unknown variable FSM initial state; on the other hand, the value
of Eq.(9) can be easily predetermined from the left-hand side, after we recover ui
t's
with 234 frames by the distinguisher in Subsection 4.2. Consequently, the well-known
technique of statistical cryptanalysis leads us to the following approach to advance
9 in contrast to the brute force attackour key-recovery attack: supposing we manage to guess one of those four biased bits
for all frames by guessing only the related key bits, then, for each frame, we XOR
the guess on the biased bit with the predetermined value of Eq.(9) to obtain one bit.
Thanks to Eq.(9), this bit shows bias for the right guess and almost balancedness
for the wrong guess (which is also called statistical distinguishable); we're able to
spot out the right guess of all guesses nally.
FSM
R1
R2
R3
R4
at Rat
Rat 2,
Rat 1,
at 2,
at 1,
Sat 2;Sat 1;Sat
Fig.2. Computation diagram of Sat 2;Sat 1;Sat
More specically, we observe two important points about E0 FSM state: rst,
the FSM state at time t always contains the two bits c0
t;c0
t 1; second, the 4-bit
FSM state is updated by its current state together with four current output bits
of LFSRs. Therefore, for xed t 2 f8k + 1;:::;8k + 4g and k 2 f0;1;2g, the bit10
L4
j=0 i
at j computed from 5 consecutive bits i
at;:::;i
at 4, is derived from the
same subset of 4  3 = 12 bits of the shared key K in all frames given P i together
with the unknown frame-dependent FSM state at time at   3 (see Fig. 2). We can
compute all the possible sequences11 0
at;:::;0
at 2 in according to every possible
FSM state for each frame i with t 2 f8k+1;:::;8k+4g and k 2 f0;1;2g. Within one
frame, of all the choices of 12-bit K0 of K and the FSM state, the sequence computed
with the right shared 12-bit K and the right FSM state yields
L4
j=0 i
at j, which
equals
L4
j=0(i
at j+8  i
bt j  i
bt j+8  i
t+j) with bias 4 when xoring with
the computable bit si
t  ui
t by Eq.(9); meanwhile, the sequence obtained with the
wrong FSM state and/or the wrong shared 12-bit K0 is expected to produce a new
biased bit
L4
j=0 0
at j (with bias ) which when xoring with si
tui
t nally generates
a bit with much smaller bias 6 that could be approximated by a randomly and
uniformly distributed bit. Therefore, we estimate that for every frame, the 12-bit
guess K0 would yield 24 randomly and uniformly distributed bits, except for the
correct guess that produces 24  1 = 15 randomly and uniformly distributed bits as
well as one biased bit (with bias 4).
Alternatively, for every frame i, we can guess 4(2+) bits K0 of K together with
the FSM state at time at      2 to compute consecutively  bits
L4
j=0 0
at j;:::,
10 For our convenience, we discuss the rst biased bit on the right-hand side of Eq.(9) from
now on; however, due to symmetry of the subscripts on the right-hand side of Eq.(9),
our discussion also applies to the other three biased bits but the last.
11 We omit the superscript i and use 
0
t to denote the candidate for 
i
t.L4
j=0 0
at j +1 with   5   (t mod 8) for xed t 2 f8k + 1;:::;8k + 4g and
k 2 f0;1;2g. Denote the parameter m as the required number of frames to be
discussed later. For the same reason as before, when we xor the  bits with si
t 
ui
t;:::;si
t+ 1ui
t+ 1, we expect the 16m sequences to comply with a truly random
distribution D0 of -bit vectors for all wrong guesses K0, and the 16m sequences
for the right guess K to comply with the biased distribution D1 of -bit vectors
approximated by
D1 
D0 + 15D0
16
; (11)
where D0 def = D
4 with 
 representing the regular convolutional product (see [12]),
and D is the distribution of
L4
j=0 c0
t j;:::;
L4
j=0 c0
t  j+1. Note that Eq.(11) means
all the biases in D0 dwindles 16 times in D1, i.e. we have the following relation
between the two Walsh coecients ^ D1(x); ^ D0(x) of any nonzero -bit vector x:
^ D1(x) =
1
16
^ D0(x): (12)
Let f : GF(2) ! R be a weighted grade for those resultant sequences 1
K0;:::;16m
K0
from the guess K0. We accordingly grade each guess K0 by
GK0 =
16m X
j=1
f(
j
K0): (13)
Using analysis of [16] and [2] (see Appendix for complete treatment), we show that
with minimal
m 
 + 2
2   1
 234:5;
the score GK of the right guess tops the chart by choosing f(x) = D1(x)  1
16 for all
x 2 GF(2). Note that with f(x) = D0(x) we obtain equivalently the same resultant
score GK0 for all K0. Also, recall that to predetermine ui
t;:::;ui
t+ 1 we need 234
frames for the distinguisher. Thus we must have
m  max

2
34;
 + 2
2   1
 2
34:5

: (14)
Algorithm 1 details the above partial key-recovery attack for 4(2 + ) bits.
5.2 Complexities and Optimization Issues
About the performance of the partial key-recovery attack, it is seen from Algo-
rithm 1 that to recover 4(2+) bits, it runs 24(2+)m24(2+) = m(2+)212+4
times to compute each 0
t for grading 24(2+) candidates. In total, we have to per-
form T = m(2 + )  212+4 operations, where m is set by Eq.(14).
Additionally, the loop from Line 9 to Line 15 can be done by one operation
after precomputation as detailed below, which makes T = m  24(2+). During pre-
processing, we run through every yat 1;:::;yat  2 (where yt denotes the Ham-
ming weight of the original four component LFSRs' output bits at time t) to
compute the 24 possible sequences 0
at;:::;0
at  1 which yield 24 sequences b0 =
L4
j=0 0
at j;:::;
L4
j=0 0
at j +1 accordingly; and then for each -bit b00, we incre-
ment the counter b
00
b0b00; last, we build up a table to store h(yat 1;:::;yat  2;b00) =
P
b0 b
00
b0b00(D1(b0b00)  1
16). The precomputation needs memory 252+  23:32+4:6
and time 24  52+  (2+ )  2  ( +2)23:32+8:6. After that, in real-time process-
ing, for each frame i, we just compute bi
00
= bi
00
0 ;:::;bi
00
 1 with bi
00
n = ui
t+n  si
t+nAlgorithm 1 The extended attack against two-level E0 to recover 4(2 + ) bits
Parameters:
1: D1 by Eq.(11)
2:  2 [1;4]
3: m by Eq.(14)
Input:
4: keystreams z
i
1 z
i
24 generated by the same K together with P
i under two-level E0 for
i = 1;:::;m
Processing:
5: choose k 2 f0;1;2g and t 2 f8k + 1;:::;8k + 4g with   5   (t mod 8)
6: for 4(2+) bits K
0 of K that are used to compute 
0
at  1;:::;
0
at and are consistent
with previously recovered bits do
7: initialize GK0 to zero
8: for i = 1;:::;m do
9: initialize counters 0;1;:::;2  1 to zero
10: for all 4-bit FSM state at time at      2 do
11: compute 
0
at  1;:::;
0
at
12: compute b = b0;:::;b 1 with bn = u
i
t+n  s
i
t+n 
L4
j=0 
0
at j n
13: increment b
14: end for
15: increment GK0 by
P
b b(D1(b)  
1
16)
16: end for
17: add the pair (GK0;K
0) into the list
18: end for
19: nd the largest GK in the list and output K
for n = 0;:::;   1, deduce yi
at 1;:::;yi
at  2 from K0;P i and increment GK0 by
h(yi
at 1;:::;yi
at  2;bi
00
). Thus, we get T = m  24(2+).
Moreover, when 24(2+)  2  m, i.e. 28+5  m, we can further reduce T
down to m + 216+9. Notice that it is the same subset of 4(2 + )-bit 
i of P i
that is used to compute yi = (yi
at 1;:::;yi
at  2) with K0. For convenience, let
g : GF(2)L ! GF(2)4(2+) map P i to 
i. We precompute a table h0(
;q) for
every 4(2 + )-bit 
 and -bit q dened by:
h0(
;q) =
m X
i=1
1
=g(P i);q=ui
tsi
t
with ui = (ui
t;:::;ui
t+ 1) and si = (si
t;:::;si
t+ 1). This takes time O(m) with
memory O(28+5). Recall that ui is determined independent of K0 by the distin-
guisher in Subsection 4.2, and ui;si;yi completely determine how to increment GK0
for frame i, i.e. by h(yi;ui  si) from last paragraph. So, in real-time process-
ing, for every K0, instead of processing frame by frame to update GK0, we simply
go through every (8 + 5)-bit pair (
;q), deduce y = (yat 1;:::;yat  2) from

 and K0, then increment GK0 by h0(
;q)h(y;q). We reach the time complexity
T = m + 24(2+)  28+5 = m + 216+9 for 28+5  m.
To summarize, we have T = m + 24(2+)  min(m;28+5). Table 4 lists the best
complexities of our partial key-recovery attack corresponding to  = 1;:::;4. Note
that the success probability of the attack in the table is estimated according to
the hypothesis test result of Eq.(11), i.e. the percentage of the 4(2 + )-bit keys to
generate a non-uniformly distributed sequence 0
at  3;:::;0
at with all the possible
FSM state.Table 4. Performance of our partial key-recovery attack against two-level E0
Frames Time Prob. of recovered key bits
 m T Success 4(2 + )
1 2
36 2
36 50:8% 12
2 2
35 2
35 87:0% 16
3 2
34:5 2
43 99:0% 20
4 2
34:3 2
52 99:9% 24
5.3 The Overall Key-recovery Attack
Now we discuss how we proceed with the optimized Algorithm 1 to recover the
full K. With  = 2 and xed k, we independently run Algorithm 1 three times
with t = 8k + 1;:::;8k + 3. And we expect at least two successes out of three
runs. After checking consistency of all the overlapping bits for every possible pair of
the algorithm outputs, we identify all the successful runs and obtain the minimum
16 + 4 = 20 key bits.
We can easily adjust Algorithm 1 to target at any of the middle three biased
bits on the right-hand side of Eq.(9) to recover 16 bits. With each modied partial
key-recovery algorithm, we repeat previous procedure to recover minimum 20 bits.
In total, we are sure to gather 4  20 = 80 bits. Since we already have 12 bits by
the distinguisher, we nally exhaustively search the remaining L 80 12 = 36 bits
within one frame. Algorithm 2 gives the abstract strategy of our complete attack.
Therefore, to recover L-bit K, our key-recovery attack works on m = 235 frames, in
time 24m + 4  3  235  240. The comparison of our attack with the best known
attacks [7{9] against two-level E0 for jKj = L is available in Table 5.
Algorithm 2 The abstract of the complete attack against two-level E0 for jKj = L
Parameters:
1: m by Eq.(14)
Input:
2: m frames of 24-bit keystreams generated by the same K together with known nonces
under two-level E0
Processing:
3: for each of the leftmost four biased bits on right-hand side of Eq.(9) do
4: choose k 2 f0;1;2g and set  = 2
5: for t = 8k + 1;8k + 2;8k + 3 do
6: use the optimized partial key-recovery attack to obtain 16 bits
7: end for
8: checking consistency among pairs of those 16 bits to obtain minimum 20-bit K
9: end for
10: exhaustively search the remaining 36 key bits within one frame
11: output the L-bit K
6 Conclusion
In this paper, based on one of the two largest biases inside the FSM within one-level
E0, for the rst time, we identify the bias at two-level E0 due to a resynchroniza-
tion aw in Bluetooth E0. Unlike the traditional approach to nd the bias, the
characterized bias does not involve the precomputation of the multiple polynomialTable 5. Comparison of our attack with the best attacks [7{9] against two-level E0 for
jKj = L
Attack Precomputation Time Frames Data Memory
[7] - 2
73 - 2
43 2
51
[8] 2
80 2
65 2 2
12:4 2
80
[9] 2
80 2
70 45 2
17 2
80
Our Attack - 2
40 2
35 2
39:6 2
35
with low weight. Second, to utilize the identied bias, we develop a novel attack to
directly recover the original encryption key for two-level E0 without reconstructing
the initial state of E0 at the second level. Our key-recovery attack works with 240
simple operations given the rst 24 bits of 235 frames. Compared with all existing
attacks [15,11,7{9] against two-level Bluetooth E0, this is the best one so far, al-
though the impossibly high amount of frames thwarts our attack to be practical. It
remains an open challenge to decrease the data complexity with practical time and
memory complexities. Finally, our attack illustrates the theory of statistical attacks
in [2,16] with an example which is not based on linear cryptanalysis.
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Appendix
All our analysis here is similar with [16] and inspired by [2]. First, by Eq.(13), we
have
Exp(GK0) =
16m
2
X
b
f(b)
for a random wrong guess K0, and by Eq.(11) we have
Exp(GK) =
15m
2
X
b
f(b) + m
X
b
D0(b)f(b);
for the right K. Hence,
Exp(GK0) = m
X
b

D0(b)  
1
2

f(b): (15)
Meanwhile, we compute the variance of GK0 as
Var(GK0) =
16m
2
X
b
(f(b))
2  
16m
22
 
X
b
f(b)
!2
: (16)
We can estimate the rank of GK over all possible GK0 by
Exp(RankGK)  24(2+)
 
 
Exp(GK0)
p
2Var(GK0)
!
: (17)
In order to achieve the top rank for GK, we see that the fraction
Exp(GK0)
p
Var(GK0)
(18)
must be large enough. This can be satised as long as the number m of available
frames is suciently large. However, aiming at a practical attack, we are concerned
with the question of how to choose f in order to minimize m under the constraint
of the top rank GK. In order to maximize the fraction (18), we rst maximize the
numerator with the constraint that the denominator is a constant and then try to
maximize the fraction over all the solutions. Dene the multivariate polynomial
gf = m
X
b

D0(b)  
1
2

f(b) +
16m
2
X
b
(f(b))
2  
16m
22
 
X
b
f(b)
!2
:Using Lagrange's multiplier, we have
@gf
@f(b)
= m

D0(b)  
1
2

+
32m
2 f(b)  
32m
22
X
b0
f(b0) = 0; (19)
for all b 2 GF(2). From Eq.(19) we infer that
f(b)   f(b0)
D0(b)   D0(b0)
= const.
for all b 6= b0. Therefore we have a universal expression of f as
f(b)   const.
D0(b)
= const0:
for all b 2 GF(2), which yields the same quantity of (18) regardless of the constants
in f. So the easiest way to dene f could be f(b) = D0(b)   1
2 for all b 2 GF(2).
Then Eq.(15) reduces to
Exp(GK0) = m
X
b

D0(b)  
1
2
2
=
m
2
X
b6=0

^ D(b)
8

m
2 (2   1)8:
On the other hand Eq.(16) reduces to
Var(GK0) 
16m
22 (2   1)
8:
So we deduce from Eq.(17) that
Exp(RankGK)  2
4(2+)
 
 
4
4
r
m(2   1)
2
!

24(2+)
p
2
e 
m(2 1)
64 
8
:
This means RankGK is expected to top the chart with
m 
256(2 + )log2
8(2   1)

 + 2
2   1
 234:5: